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Abstract. Like no other, the Hungarian psychologist and philosopher Melchior Palágyi recognized 
the power of imagination not only as a prerequisite for the ability to imagine and think, but also 
as a fundamental condition for movement and perception. With the original theory of the “virtual 
imagination”, Palágyi’s ideas inspired Philosophical Anthropology and medicine after his death. 
Today, however, he and his theory seem to have been forgotten. The following review is therefore 
dedicated to the work “Leben und Geist” (Life and Spirit), edited by Heiko Heublein and published in 
2018, which is a representative cross-section of Palágyi’s work. The review focuses on his reflections 
on the theory of perception, which are the core not only of the anthology, but of his oeuvre. The most 
important cornerstones of Palágyi’s theory of perception are the “theory of intermittent perception” 
and the “virtual imagination”.
“It is an unparalleled wonder that life, without abandoning the place where it occupies, 
can nonetheless behave as if it has escaped to another place in space and time”1 (p. 27), 
is the fundamental statement of a book hardly known today with the short title Theory 
of Perception. The author was the Jewish Hungarian philosopher Melchior Palágyi 
(1859–1924). This astounding ability to overcome physical limits is what Palágyi calls 
virtual imagination. Philosopher Ludwig Klages, his most loyal follower, celebrated 
this process as a phenomenal discovery, which reveals an original theory of perception.
Today, Palágyi plays only a minor role, if any, in the debates on perception the-
ory. His name does not appear even in a historical account of cognitive psychology.2 
Hungarian academic philosophy too has long been indifferent: almost dismissive 
1 “Es ist ein Wunder ohnegleichen, daß das Leben, ohne von der Stelle zu weichen, wo es sich 
befindet, sich trotzdem so verhalten kann, als ob es an eine andere Stelle des Raumes oder an 
eine andere Stelle der Zeit entwichen wäre.”
2 Toepfer, “Biologie und Anthropologie der Wahrnehmung,” 13.
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of him.3 Nevertheless, beyond Klages, in particular the representatives of Philosophical 
Anthropology incorporated the concept of virtual imagination into their own theories 
(p. 31). Along with Max Scheler, Frederik Buytendijk, Erich Rothacker and Helmuth 
Plessner, it was above all Arnold Gehlen who, in his major work Der Mensch Seine 
Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, recognized a fixed point of reference in Palágyi’s 
thinking and re-contextualized his theses.4 After all, it was Palágyi who, unlike almost 
all preceding theorists, had emphasized the central role of motion for perception.5
In view of the importance of perception theory and the obvious discrepancy 
between prominent advocacy on the one hand and the complete absence of a broad 
reception on the other, it is all the more gratifying that, thanks to the anthology 
published in 2018 with the programmatic title Der Gegensatz von Geist und Leben, 
central texts of Palágyi’s work have finally become accessible again. Until now these 
texts were only available in antiquarian bookshops. Some of them, indeed, had 
never been published.
Considering the fact that Palágyi’s impressive work had sunk out of sight in 
the past, it is not surprising that the book opens with two contributions. In the first 
preface Christian Möckel presents Palágyi’s works in the fields of natural science, 
psychology and philosophy and discusses the attention Palágyi received from some 
philosophers of his time. The second introduction, by the editor Heiko Heublein, 
is nineteen pages long: unusually extensive and detailed, and begins with the inter-
esting story of Palágyi’s life. Furthermore, the editor provides a clear and concise 
introduction to Palágyi’s theory of perception. Its basic concepts are intermittent 
consciousness and virtual movement resp. virtual imagination (p. 120, pp. 139–70). 
In this context Heublein focuses on central key terms of Palágyi’s work such as 
polarity, vitality, sensation, feeling and virtual imagination (pp. 21–28). Finally, spe-
cial attention is paid to Ludwig Klages, who gave greater recognition and praise than 
anybody else to the originality and breadth of Palágyi’s contribution to philosophy.
Essays by the young Palágyi
The first section is a compilation of Palágyi’s essays on various topics, which give 
the reader a first impression of his ideas. One is struck by the clear, transparent 
language that many German philosophers of that time lacked. The introspection 
that Palágyi describes in the first essay, Insichgehen, leads to the awareness of our 
individuality and thus to our loneliness. Everyone has his very own world, which 
3 Pöhlmann, Philosophie, 512.
4 Fischer, Philosophische Anthropologie, 166.
5 Walthes, Zur Theorie der virtuellen Bewegung, 179.
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no one else can enter. The clarity of Palágyi’s language can also be found in his med-
itations on the philosopher Kant and Calderón’s drama Leben ein Traum as well as 
in the essay Aufeinanderfolge von Schlaf- und Wachzuständen (p. 65).
In his reflections Über den Philosophischen Pessimismus und Optimismus 
Palágyi reveals more critical questions. He criticizes the fatal separation of mind and 
life as well as the overestimation of human spirit, which had begun with Descartes’ 
ideas (pp. 53–56): If the French philosopher, when he spoke his cogito, also made 
vivo in an essential condition for the cogito, the fatal separation of mind and life, 
which Palágyi also calls the “basic evil of the modern world view,” would not have 
occurred (p. 53). The statement “I feel, therefore I live,” should be accorded equal 
rank with the statement “I think, therefore I am” (p. 53).
Polarity and the Creative
Polarity and creative power are the topics of the second section. Armin Müller, a 
physiologist close to Philosophical Anthropology, emphasizes that the idea of polar-
ity has always contributed important impulses to philosophical thinking. Above all, 
Goethe’s ideas about animate and inanimate nature, visible and invisible, are based 
on the concept of polarity. In the unfolding of the One into opposites and the reuni-
fication of what has been separated into a new unity the Philosopher Schelling also 
recognizes a general law of essence.6 The physiologist Buytendijk defines it as follows:
So polarity is the structure of a concrete given something, in which two 
opposite but mutually determining directions are effective. These oppo-
sites are only in their being together. Their in themselves opposing unity 
forms the structure of the concrete object.7
Palágyi places his work in the romantic tradition (p. 81). In contrast to 
Descartes’ epistemology he believes that the root of all human abilities lies in polar-
ity (p. 80). He pays particular attention to both polar forces, the vital and the mental, 
that are connected to form an I. The vital force transfers the sensations from the out-
side world unconsciously into a structured context. The mental act of consciousness 
makes one aware of these internal processes. Their cooperation enables the percep-
tion of the outside world (p. 80). The mind has only a subordinate function here. In 
contrast, it plays the primary role in all thinking, values and will (p. 81f).
6 Müller, Grundkategorien des Lebendigen, 147.
7 “Polarität ist also die Struktur eines konkret gegebenen Etwas, in der zwei gegensätzliche aber 
einander gegenseitigbestimmende Richtungen wirksam sind. Diese Gegensätze sind nur in 
ihrem Zusammensein. Ihre in sich gegensätzliche Einheit bildet die Struktur des konkreten 
Objektes.” Buytendijk, Allgemeine Theorie, 65.
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Theory of perception
Palágyi does not ascribe the ability to put sensory data into an orderly context, to the 
mind. This has far-reaching consequences for his theory of consciousness. According 
to him, the structuring of incoming data can only happen in a vital process before the 
mind intervenes, or before conscious awareness occurs. Three vital processes form 
the basis here: sensations, feelings and virtual imagination. Perception requires the 
unconscious interaction of these three vital processes. Sensation is limited to quali-
ties of objects such as color, temperature or outline from the outside world. Feeling, 
on the other hand, is conveyed by the vitality of one’s own body (p. 27). “Only the 
non-living is sensed, only life is felt” (p. 164). The virtual imagination has a moder-
ating influence. It has a stimulating and at the same time an ordering effect on sen-
sations and feelings. Without these three vital processes, neither spatial perception 
nor perception of shapes is possible (p. 90, pp. 139–70). They must interact before 
the mind intervenes—then conscious perception can occur (p. 21, 116).
The theory of consciousness, which is based on the polar forces of mind and 
life and in which the three vital processes interact, is contrary to the theory of sen-
sory perception of English sensualism. The sensualists Locke, Berkley and Hume 
developed the idea that perception and cognition are based exclusively on sensa-
tions (p. 93, 105, 107, 145, 135). The position of the English sensualists has became 
a dogma of all modern psychology, which Palágyi vehemently criticizes (p. 107). 
Palágyi repeatedly points out that mind should not be equated with vital processes.
Intermittent awareness and sense of time
In contrast to the sensualists, Palágyi assumes that sensations represent a contin-
uous stream (pp. 5–96). Conscious perception, however, does not keep pace with 
this flow of sensations (p. 116): rather, perceptual consciousness has an intermittent 
character. However, we are subject to the illusion that it is uninterrupted (pp. 117–
18). While sensations continue to flow, the human mind moves jerkily from one act 
of perception to another. In this sense Palágyi speaks of a pulse of consciousness 
and the resulting perception (p. 118). The perceptual acts have a certain frequency, 
which can be investigated experimentally (pp. 122–23).
These considerations were not new: In his classic essay Die Abhängigkeit 
unseres Weltbildes von der Länge des Moments the Russian physician and biologist 
Karl Ernst von Baer had speculated about the world view dependent on the small-
est still perceptible unit of time. With these speculations Baer had opened the door 
to alternative, almost fantastic worlds of perception. His investigations anticipated 
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the cinematographic technique with its possibilities of stretching and gathering.8 
These ideas of the mental pulses and their effect on perception had a strong influ-
ence on Palágyi’s work.9 Finally they found their way to European research lab-
oratories. 1951 the Swiss biologist Adolf Portmann presented a large number of 
empirical findings in his essay Die Zeit im Leben der Organismen,10 which describes 
how living interacts with time. The smallest still perceptible unit of time of a snail 
is 1/4 second and thus includes far fewer impressions compared to the 1/16-second 
pulse of a human being. By the way, the fighting fish has a unit of about 1/30 sec-
ond. That means that the unit of time of the fighting fish contains significantly more 
impressions than that of humans.
However, the theory of intermittent perception is not sufficient in itself to 
establish a theory of consciousness. Therefore Palágyi completes the theory with 
his principle of the relation between two acts of consciousness. According to him, 
a single act can never have a consciousness of itself (pp. 125–33). Only a second, 
later act can give the previous one consciousness. Every human perception is rather 
a delayed perception. We live in the illusion that we can master events in front of 
us with the present moment (Jetztblick) of our consciousness and we “[…] do not 
realize that even with the highest attention we can never catch a real now”.11
Virtual fantasy – virtual movement
In addition to the theory of intermittent consciousness, thanks of Heublein’s 
anthology the reader is introduced to the outstanding concept of an all-controlling 
instance—that of virtual movement resp. the virtual fantasy (pp. 139–70). When 
we speak of imagination, we associate waking reverie or poetic-artistic fantasies. 
For Palágyi, however, virtual imagination is essential. It is the universal prerequisite 
for all references to the world and all perception (pp. 145–70).12 This is why he calls 
the process of imagination the “highest development of the vital” (p. 161). Palágyi 
developed his theory of virtual imagination with regard to feelings, sensations and 
consciousness in constant dialogue with some contemporary psychologists and 
physiologists. The individual investigations have one thing in common: they all 
revolve around the key concept of movement. Wherever imagination is involved, 
there must be movement (pp. 145–70).
8 Bühler and Rieger, Vom Übertier, 222.
9 Palágyi, Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen, 31.
10 Portmann, Biologie und Geist, 144–45.
11 Palágyi, Wahrnehmungslehre, 33.
12 Kasparowicz and Rieger, Handbuch Virtualität, 5.
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Sensations alone do not enable us to recognize a shape. They only stimulate 
our imagination. The mediator between the sensory sensations and conscious per-
ception, however, is the virtual imagination. “It is only this imagination that lets 
us grasp the shape” (p. 147). To illustrate this, Palágyi repeatedly uses everyday 
examples, which are comprehensible to the reader. The outlines of a cup are per-
ceived by covering its opening with the hand. However, the shape of the cup rim 
is not perceived by sense of touch. This sense of touch rather stimulates the virtual 
imagination, which makes an imaginary resp. virtual movement around the cup rim 
and so one can grasp its spatial outline. Furthermore, virtual movement plays a role 
not only for tactile perception, but for any kind of perception (p. 147). According to 
Palágyi every perception is a virtual grasping and touching of the object.13
But the mere grasping of a place in space, the mere relocation of a thing 
or a process to any spatial location would be impossible, if we were not 
able to point to the place in question through real and imagined move-
ments (p. 144).14
Palágyi is convinced that the sensory processes do not only stimulate our imag-
ination—vice versa, the imagination affects the sensations. That is why he describes 
virtual movement as a “sensation-awakening” process (p. 164). The induced sensations 
are just as real as those caused by the sensory impression.15 If in our imagination, we 
bring a piece of lemon to the mouth, we do feel an acid-like sensation. The anticipated 
act of biting by the virtual movement induces a sensation of citric acid (p. 163).
At first glance, there seems to be no difference between a virtual movement 
and the idea of this movement. The phantasm of movement is, as Ludwig Klages 
emphasizes, not a real movement, and certainly not the idea of a movement and 
must be distinguished from the usual “urge to move” (p. 27). The imagined move-
ment is not a conscious mental operation, not a cognitive act, though it is based on 
a real nervous process (p. 156).16
Primacy of the sense of touch
Palágyi’s theory of perception is difficult to access, because he focuses his analyses pri-
marily on the development of tactile perception, the ability to perceive objects through 
13 Kehl, Die Bildung der Vorstellung, 176.
14 “Aber das bloße Erfassen eines Ortes im Raum, das bloße Verlegen eines Dinges oder eines 
Vorganges an irgendeine räumliche Stelle wäre unmöglich, wenn wir nicht imstande wären, 
durch wirkliche undeingebildete Bewegungen auf den betreffenden Ort hinzuweisen.”
15 Kehl, Die Bildung der Vorstellung, 179.
16 Palágyi, Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen, 124; Kehl, Die Bildung der Vorstellung, 178.
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the sense of touch. We often believe that there exist only visual phantasy or facial phan-
tasy. Palágyi, however, regards the tactile imagination (Tasteinbildung) as the decisive 
precondition for the development of our entire fantasy life (p. 142). Tactile imagination 
is bound to movable organs and limited to the surroundings of humans.
This unusual consideration starts by comparing sighted people with those 
born blind (pp.  140–41). If someone who was born blind runs his hand over a 
tabletop, he is only able to grasp the tabletop as square, because at the same 
time he makes a virtual movement with his hand (p.  143). The contours of the 
objects are only revealed to the blind by imagined tactile movements. While 
blind people move and make contact with things, their tactile imagination 
enjoys autonomy in their own surroundings. Tactile and visual imagination 
are inseparably linked (p.  141). However, for persons endowed with a sense of 
sight, this tactile imagination is often withered by the visual representation.
For sighted people, the fantasy of touch does not only support the visual or 
facial fantasy, but vice versa: the facial fantasy supports the fantasy of touch. In 
the eyes of Palágyi the sense of touch is the vital foundation of all other senses and 
thus the foundation of all perception (p. 143). All in all Palágyi amerges as hapti-
cally oriented. His work can be read in the light of the debate about a hierarchy of 
human senses, which was established in psychology, philosophy and art theory by 
representatives like Gottfried Herder, Alois Riehl, Hermann Friedmann, Wilhelm 
Wundt and Helmuth Plessner.17
One central thesis underlying his theory of virtual fantasy is the phenomenon 
of “passive-active dual sensation” (passiv-aktiven Doppelempfindung). According to 
Palágyi the sense of touch is constitutive to obtaining perception and knowledge 
of an external world.18 The tactile sensation of a person is the only sensation which 
induces both: foreign- and self perception.19 If we touch a foreign body with our 
hand, the sensation is composed of two opposing phases: for a short moment the 
hand is active. During this active phase we feel the foreign body. In the next moment, 
however, the hand is put in a passive state, so that it feels itself being pressed by the 
foreign body.20 These opposing phases enable us to perceive not only the outside 
world but also ourselves.21 This conclusion is not only to be found in the treatise 
of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty; Gehlen too included Palágyi’s analyses 
about the “passive-active dual sensation” (p. 184) in his major work.22
17 Friedmann, Die Welt der Formen, 96.
18 Palágyi, Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen, 116.
19 Walthes, Zur Theorie der virtuellen Bewegung, 201.
20 Palágyi, Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen, 135–36.
21 Palágyi, Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen, 117, 201.
22 Gehlen, Der Mensch, 167.
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This important phenomenon of double sensation in connection with the 
distinction of the “I” from the outside world could have received more space in 
Heublein’s selection of texts. The interested reader should take a closer look at 
Palágyi’s lectures in his work Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen.
Virtual fantasy and self control
Another phenomenon related to virtual imagination is the development of controlled 
movements, which plays an important role in the development of infants. In the ear-
liest stage the infant is only able to move its hands aimlessly back and forth. If the 
infant remained in this state perception would never occur. “[…] who never is mas-
ter of his movement, can never find anything and cannot put anything in one place 
[…].”23 “But”, one wonders, “how do the random eye movements of the infant become 
a steerable and then also self-directing gaze?” “And how does the formless back and 
forth movement of the hands become a gradually forming, purposeful movement?” 
Palágyi’s answer here is concise: The aimless movements must develop gradually into 
controlled movements through virtual fantasy resp. virtual movements (p. 156).
This fundamental concept of controlling the real movement by the virtual 
movement associated with sensory-motor circular processes had a sustainable 
impact on Philosophical Anthropology.24 In his book “Wege zum Verständnis der 
Tiere” the Anthropologist Buytendijk discusses for example the following situation: 
When crossing a road, the totality of objects, distances and real movements enter 
into an act of perception, which depends on the activity of the subject. In this act, 
which contains virtual movements to the highest degree, the future of each real 
movement is predetermined for the next moment. The physiologist emphasizes 
that this future action is not an idea outside the flow of life, but it is only formed by 
the respective situation without consciousness.25 Besides Buytendijk, Gehlen too 
draws attention to the anticipatory-constructive competence of the imagination, 
which he calls the “flywheel of action” (Schwungrad der Handlung).26
Gehlen focuses on what he calls the “anticipated response behavior of the 
manners” (vorweggenommene Antwortverhalten der Umgangsdinge).27 He explains 
this phenomenon using the example of fine motor movements: if the skilful phy-
sician operates in body cavities without seeing, he only palpates with the tip of the 
23 “[...] wer niemals Herr seiner Bewegung ist, der kann auch niemals etwas finden und nichts 
Empfundenes an irgendeinen Ort verlegen [...]”
24 Fischer, Philosophische Anthropologie, 170.
25 Buytendijk, Wege zum Verständnis der Tiere, 243.
26 Thies, Arnold Gehlen zur Einführung, 112.
27 Gehlen, Der Mensch, 1971, 170.
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probe or scalpel. In this context, Gehlen speaks of pre-designed virtual tactile sen-
sations that would follow the fine movements. To make this special phenomenon 
more understandable, the anthropologist mentions another example: If, with closed 
eyes, one brings a knife towards to the skin of the forehead, one can clearly feel the 
imaginary sensation which already responds to the imagined continuation of the 
movement. Such anticipations of expected sensations can already be observed in 
children. If the grasping movement of a child fails, it will attentively observe its 
fingers, because it expected a touch—but that did not occur. Every movement is 
linked with expectations. In his analysis Gehlen also describes the phenomenon 
of “anticipated response behavior” as the “nerve of all final, purposeful activity”.28
The illustrative examples of motion control offer possibilities for compre-
hending Palágyi’s concept of virtual motion. The practice of a musical instrument 
starts with unfamiliar movements. The virtual movement, which must first be prac-
ticed in order to guide the subsequent real movement, becomes more and more 
active (pp.  156–57). Finally virtual steering grows increasingly unconscious and 
gains the character of an automated movement or automated imagination. The more 
our movement becomes habitual, the less it needs to be initiated and guided by a 
deliberate decision. This does not mean, however, that virtual movement does not 
play a role. Without virtual control, the automated movement would fall back to 
the level of an infant’s (pp. 156–57). Palágyi and Gehlen declare virtual imagina-
tion to be a basic human competence. Without it, it would be impossible to pass 
through the first stages of ontogenetic development, in which sensory perception 
and movement coordination are developed.29
Palágyi’s theory on the test bench
While reading the book questions arise repeatedly about the empirical foundation of 
Palágyi’s theses. Palágyi himself was unable to confirm his theory of consciousness 
because he lacked the institutional prerequisites for this. Nevertheless, he was con-
stantly trying to find other experiments to confirm his hypothesis.30 Only after his 
death were attempts made on the neurological side to do justice to the importance of 
virtual movement. Among others the physiologist J. Buytendijk, who headed the first 
laboratory for animal physiology in Europe, examined Palágyi’s theories experimen-
tally. Together with the animal psychologist Werner Fischel he performed a series of 
experiments on sighted and blind rats in a labyrinth. The experiments were intended 
28 Gehlen, Der Mensch, 184.
29 Thies, Arnold Gehlen zur Einführung, 111.
30 Walthes, Zur Theorie der virtuellen Bewegung, 242–43.
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to test whether the control of action takes place through imaginary movement.31 
In addition, the series of experiments conducted by the Heidelberg physician Prince 
Auersperg should not remain unmentioned. Auersperg, who belonged to the close cir-
cle around the physician Viktor von Weizsäcker, had tried to connect virtual steering 
to the phenomenon of “prolepsis”. Prolepsis includes an anticipatory act that does not 
occur in response to external stimuli and is similar to Palágyi’s virtual movement.32
Space-time
The fourth and last section is dedicated to Palágyi’s metabiological basic concepts 
with which, as a mathematician and logistician, he established a new theory of space 
and time. He developed a model that combines the three space dimensions together 
with time to form the four-dimensional space-time. Although there were certain 
formal similarities to the space-time of Henri Poincaré and Hermann Minkowski, 
it lacked the essential features of the theory of relativity: the central role of the 
speed of light and the dependence of the four quantities on the respective reference 
system which is described by the Lorenz transformation. Accordingly, Palágyi’s 
model was decisively rejected by contemporary physicists such as Max Born on the 
grounds that it had nothing in common with relativity theory.
Summary
To conclude, we can say that, because Palágyi’s theory of space and time has found 
its way into Heublein’s compilation, the reader is given a comprehensive overview 
of the philosopher’s broad range of topics. “Melchior Palágyi’s significance ulti-
mately lies in his persisting effort of bringing to light the sub-rational, unconscious 
capacities of the body and of considering them equal in importance to the rational 
faculties of the mind.”33 With the present anthology Heublein has succeeded in pro-
viding a representative cross-section of Palágyi’s work. Above all, the latter’s the-
ory of virtual movement deserves to be rediscovered. Along with Wilhelm Roux’s 
concept of vital self–regulation, Wolfgang Köhler’s Gestaltpsychology and Jakob von 
Uexküll’s Umweltlehre, Palágyi’s theory of perception is an important concept in 
Philosophical Anthropology.34 Today, more than hundred years after the appear-
ance of Palágyi’s original theory of perception, it seems, following the scholar 
31 Buytendijk and Fischel, “Versuche über die Steuerung der Bewegungen,” 63–96.
32 Sack, Von der Neuropathologie zur Phänomenologie, 72; Auersperg and Buhrmester, 
“Experimenteller Beitrag,” 274–76.
33 Csepregi, “Melchior Palágyi’s Theory of Imagination,” 129–31.
34 Bühler, Lebende Körper, 154.
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Renate Walthes, to be a mediating theory, more than ever, between neuroscience 
and educational science.35 Moreover, Palágyi’s theory could have an influence on 
contemporary embodiment discourse.
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